This paper develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical …nding that multi-division …rms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. We characterize an internal capital market as a principal-agent relationship in which headquarters with control rights over internal funds has private information about the relative quality of future investment opportunities of its divisions. Then today's capital allocation may serve as a signal about future ones to divisional managers. To boost managerial e¤ort, headquarters distributes capital relatively evenly.
Introduction
Well-functioning internal capital markets channel scarce …nancial resources into their most productive use. In multi-division …rms, headquarters has ownership rights and therefore is able to allocate capital across divisions (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994) . This allows for steering funds towards divisions with relatively favorable investment opportunities (Stein, 1997) . The value of such internal capital markets has been questioned recently, however. Empirical research points towards the distortion of capital allocation in favor of divisions with poor growth prospects relative to those with good growth opportunities (Scharfstein, 1998, Shin and Stulz, 1998 , and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). 1 These …ndings have led to a number of theoretical characterizations of the workings of internal capital markets that are consistent with such "socialistic"allocations of …nancial resources in internal capital markets. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that managers of divisions with poor investment opportunities have stronger incentives to spend time lobbying to increase their capital allocations. When there is a preference of top management to compensate these managers with capital allocations rather than with higher salaries, this behavior leads to larger than e¢ cient allocations to weaker divisions. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) show that a very uneven resource allocation can lead divisional managers to steer their investment policies away from e¢ cient cooperative investments towards those that only bene…t the own division. To avoid such ine¢ ciencies, headquarters tilts capital allocations towards divisions with fewer investment opportunities. In a setting in which divisional managers have private information about project quality and in addition need to be incentivized to provide e¤ort, Bernardo, Luo and Wang (2006) show that headquarters optimally biases project choice in favor of weaker divisions. The reason is that this allows for less expensive incentive provision for managers in stronger divisions.
This paper provides an alternative explanation of socialistic internal capital markets. We present a model in which headquarters has private information about divisional capital productivity. The argument is as follows: When capital productivity in divisions is persistent, current capital allocations by headquarters are indicative of future allocations. Divisional managers learn from current allocations about their own division's relative capital productivity. When divisional managers prefer larger allocations to smaller ones this is relevant information. The reason is that when managers choose to engage in pro- 1 These empirical studies are not free of measurement and endogeneity problems. Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) provide a comprehensive discussion of those issues in the literature on internal capital markets. Also, plant-level evidence in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) shows that multi-industry …rms reallocate resources in favor of strong divisions in case of positive demand shocks. ductivity improvements, they do so based on the expected increase in capital allocation that is caused by such e¤orts. The initial relative captial productivity allows each manager a better estimate of the expected marginal e¤ect of e¤ort provision on her utility. A strategically acting headquarters has an incentive to allocate capital evenly across divisions to suggest equal capital productivity. In this case, managers' expected relative increase in next-period's capital allocation from exerting e¤ort is maximized. The cost of such a policy when divisions di¤er in their productivity is the currently ine¢ cient capital allocation whereas future capital returns are increased due to larger managerial e¤orts on productivity improvements. In situations in which e¤ort exertion by divisional managers is su¢ ciently important, the bene…ts to headquarters of such an even capital allocation despite productivity di¤erences outweigh its cost. This behavior implies that divisions with better investment opportunities do not receive as much capital as their relative capital productivity would imply.
A number of arguments can be made for the existence of private information of top management (acting as headquarters) vis a vis divisional managers. First, headquarters is well informed about all the divisions of the …rm whereas divisional managers have detailed knowledge only about their own divisions. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that headquarters holds better information about the relative productivity of capital across divisions than divisional managers. Second, top management is likely to be better informed about issues that in ‡uence the pro…tability of several divisions such as general economic conditions, political developments, strategic intentions, potential merger opportunities or possible spillovers across divisions. 2 Such informational advantages often result from top managers'activities beyond the realm of the …rm such as board memberships, activities in professional associations or the use of her network of personal contacts. 3 For reasons of simplicity, we develop a model in which headquarters is better informed about capital productivity than the divisions themselves. However, because divisional managers care exclusively about the amount of capital allocated to their own divisions, only the relative levels of productivity matter for their decisions. 2 The literature on strategic management recognizes the informational advantages of CEOs and other higher-ranked individuals. For example, Mintzberg (1975) sums it up as follows: "The manager may not know everything but typically knows more than subordinates do. Studies have shown this relationship to hold for all managers, from street gang leaders to U.S. presidents."
The argument brought forward in this paper is based on the notion that headquarters' ability to reallocate capital across divisions may sti ‡e managerial initiative. This has also been noted by Brusco and Panunzi (2005) 
The Model
We model an internal capital market with three agents: headquarters and two divisional managers i, i = A; B. There are two periods, t = 1; 2. Agents are risk-neutral. Headquarters distributes a …xed amount of funds I t based on expected performance, i.e. capital productivity q i;t , of divisions A and B. Available funds I t > 0 are deterministic and are derived from investments taken in previous periods. There is no access to external …nance.
We allow for strictly positive expected investment returns with decreasing returns to scale and assume that divisional periodical payo¤s i;t are given by
where I i;t denotes the period t capital investment in division i and k > 0 parametrizes returns to scale. Divisional capital productivity q i;t > 1 depends linearly on a baseline productivity q > 1, which is commonly known, and a productivity parameter x i 2 f0; xg, which is private to headquarters. In addition, divisional managers can exert e¤ort in period 1, e i 2 f0; eg, e > 0, to increase capital productivity of the own division in the subsequent period. In this formulation, e¤ort can be interpreted as engaging in restructuring production or distribution, repositioning part of the product portfolio, mentoring employees, furthering long-term relationships to customers or suppliers, or simply searching for good investment opportunities to be implemented in the upcoming period. Concretely, divisional periodical capital productivities are given by
We assume that divisions have su¢ ciently pro…table investment opportunities such that available funds are fully invested at each date. For simplicity, we assume that payo¤s from investments in t = 1; 2 are additively separable and do not accrue before the end of period 2. Hence, second period payo¤s are independent of headquarters'period 1 capital allocation. The interest rate is normalized to zero. Let t 2 [0; 1] denote the period t portion of available funds I t invested in division A and t ( t ) denote headquarter's periodical payo¤ when it allocates t . Thus, considering equation (1), for all t = 1; 2;
In our model divisional managers have empire-building preferences and strictly prefer more capital to less. 4 E¤ort creates a private cost to the manager c(e i ) which is c > 0, if e i = e and 0, if e i = 0. Consequently, in this two-period setting managers seek to maximize utility described by the sum of private bene…ts derived from assets under control in both periods less the cost from exerting e¤ort in period 1:
The sequence of actions and events is shown in …gure 1. 4 Allowing for e¤ective performance-sensitive contracting obviously improves the opportunities to align managers' interests with those of headquarters. If doing so is costly due to frictions, we are unable to identify a reason why this could structurally a¤ect our results. This is the simplest way to model asymmetric information between headquarters and divisional managers with respect to relative capital productivities. In the following, we refer to Signal L as headquarters'"type Low" (denoted by L) and Signal H as its "type High" (denoted by H).
2. Headquarters distributes available funds I 1 based on observation of q i;1 = q + x i .
3. After observing capital allocation 1 divisional managers may or may not simultaneously exert e¤ort e i : This stage of the model represents a game in which both managers compete for capital to be distributed by headquarters in period 2.
4. After learning q i;2 = q + x i + e i , headquarters allocates available funds I 2 . Distribution of funds now depends on managers'e¤ort levels e i .
5. At the end of period 2, payo¤s i;t from investments taken in the previous periods realize.
As it is apparent from the sequence of the game and since we assume that periods are additively separable, headquarters'two-period decision problem simpli…es into a pair of problems, one for each period. We can write headquarters'total payo¤ as 1 ( 1 )+ 2 ( 2 ):
Analysis
In the next sections we examine optimal capital allocation of headquarters and equilibrium behavior of divisional management. We decompose the analysis of two-period capital allocation into three stages: A …rst stage, in which headquarters chooses period-1 capital allocation, a second stage, in which divisional managers follow with their e¤ort decision, and a third stage, in which headquarters makes its period-2 capital allocation choice after productivity-enhancing activities of divisional management have realized. Since equilibrium behavior is sequentially rational, we solve the game backwards, beginning with headquarters'period-2 capital allocation. We restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria.
Capital Allocation in Period 2
By the beginning of period 2, headquarters learns period 2 productivity of its divisions q i;2 with certainty. Hence, headquarters solves:
subject to
Considering the strict concavity of (5), the optimal rule for capital allocation in period 2 is:
which implies that headquarters shifts all funds to division i if q i;2 relative to q j;2 is su¢ ciently large and headquarters evenly splits funds if q A;2 = q B;2 . Using equation (2) establishes the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In period 2, headquarters'allocation is a function of managerial e¤ort e i , the type-dependent value of x i , and the level of level of diminishing returns to scale k.
Exerting e¤ort weakly increases a manager's own capital allocation and thereby weakly decreases the other manager's allocation. In addition, period 2 capital allocation, say to division A, 2 ; weakly increases in x and weakly decreases in k.
Managerial E¤ort in Period 1
We turn to the previous stage of the game in which managers choose period 1 e¤ort levels e i . Divisional management anticipates that headquarters reacts optimally given pro…tabilities q i;2 and allocates capital according to (7) . Since funds I 2 are scarce, managers compete for their share of the limited total capital budget. This competition for funds represents a game of incomplete information: Each manager chooses whether to exert e¤ort or not while being uncertain about the (type-dependent) value of x i and the (unobservable) e¤ort choice of her counterpart.
To examine equilibrium strategies, we …rst solve for managers' e¤ort choice as if headquarters'type was common knowledge. Then, this stage of the model becomes a game of complete information and for the e¤ort pair (e 1 ; e 2 ) to be a Nash equilibrium of this subgame, each manager's strategy is a best response to the other's, while considering headquarters'optimal allocation on arbitrary levels of e¤ort. Given the structure of our model, managements'strategy under incomplete information follows immediately.
Common Knowledge: Headquarters is Type L When headquarters is type L and x A = x B = 0, intrinsic capital productivities of divisions are identical. Hence, utility functions of managers are symmetric. When managers work equally intense, the contest ends as a tie, headquarters equally splits funds in period 2 and both managers receive payo¤s that yield
I 2 : Otherwise, the manager who works hard receives strictly more funds than the other. For the sake of expositional tractability and without loss of generality, let e kI 2 : Then, if one divisional manager chooses a high level of e¤ort and the other does not, headquarters allocates total available funds to the former and zero funds to the latter. The normal-form of this subgame is given as in …gure 2. By convention, managers A and B represent the row and column players, respectively. Thus, if the cost of managers'e¤ort is su¢ ciently small compared to their empire-building preferences and
e i = e is the dominant strategy for each player and the e¤ort pair (e; e) is a unique Nash equilibrium of this subgame. Then, it turns out that managers have an incentive to work hard and managers'interest is aligned with headquarters'in order to maximize …rm pro…ts. For the remainder of this paper, we assume that equation (8) holds.
Common Knowledge: Headquarters is Type H When headquarters is type H and x A = x^x B = 0, intrinsic capital productivities of divisions di¤er in favor of division A. Hence, utility functions of managers are asymmetric. When managers exert equal e¤ort, 2 > 0:5 and headquarters allocates strictly more to division A: We make the simplifying assumption that diversity in productivities x dominates e¤ort and x e kI 2 . Then, the more pro…table division A receives all funds regardless of whether its manager works hard or not. More precisely, pro…tability of division A relative to that of B is su¢ ciently distant, that marginal return on the last unit I 2 invested in A is strictly smaller than the marginal return on the …rst unit invested in B. This straightforwardly captures the disincentive e¤ect of headquarters' authority to allocate scarce resources to the most pro…table projects as suggested by Brusco and Panunzi (2005) and Inderst and Laux (2005) . It also cuts down the number of di¤erent cases to be considered without changing the important conclusions. 5 The winner of the game, manager A, is determined ex ante and both managers do not exert e¤ort in equilibrium, e i = 0, as long as c > 0. The subgame can be represented as in …gure 3. Let us now examine equilibrium e¤ort levels in the more interesting case in which information on productivity x i is private to headquarters and managers have incomplete information on true investment prospects.
Incomplete Information: Headquarters'Type is Private Information
Under incomplete information, managers do not know (either their "opponent's"or their own) true productivities ex ante, which implies that managers are unable to distinguish one type of headquarters from the other. Let p(L) = and p(H) = 1 denote managements'common prior belief about headquarters'type.
Before choosing e i , managers observe headquarters'current capital allocation 1 . When capital productivity in divisions is persistent, this is relevant information: 1 is indicative of future allocations. Hence, divisional managers may learn from current allocations about headquarters'private information and may update prior probabilities about headquarters'type. For example, a particular capital allocation may reveal to managers that headquarters is type L and, thus, implies that managers choose to exert e¤ort. However, other allocations may not disclose additional information. We denote the resulting posterior beliefs as p(Lj 1 ) = ( 1 ) and p(Hj 1 ) = 1
( 1 ).
As diverse intrinsic pro…tabilities (a type H headquarters) weaken managerial incentives to engage in productivity-enhancing activities, the equilibrium e¤ort a manager is willing to exert depends on posterior beliefs. To make this point clear, consider for example manager B. When both managers exert e¤ort, e i = e, manager B has the chance to end up in a tie and receive 1 2 I 2 with probability ( 1 ) (since headquarters is type L) but also faces the risk of losing and getting nothing with probability 1
( 1 ) (since headquarters is type H). Thus, managers are uncertain about both, their opponent's and their own payo¤ function. By applying this logic to all possible payo¤s of this subgame, managers' competition for funds can be represented as in …gure 4. For brevity, we omit parameter It is straightforward to derive equilibrium e¤ort levels. Our results are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Posterior beliefs re ‡ect any information conveyed by headquarters'capital allocation in period 1. Equilibrium e¤ort levels (e A ; e B ) are sensitive to these and weakly increase with the belief that headquarters is type L (e A ; e B ) = 8 > < > :
The intuition is as follows: When managers with empire-building tendencies choose to engage in productivity improvements, they do so based on the expected increase in capital allocation that is caused by such e¤orts. The incentive to choose a high level of e¤ort is strong provided that posterior beliefs suggest that heterogeneous productivity across divisions is not too likely. In addition, cost of e¤ort c must be su¢ ciently low relative to empire-building bene…ts I 2 ; then, even a small posterior belief p(Lj 1 ) = ( 1 ) induces managers to work hard.
Capital Allocation in Period 1
We now move to the …rst stage of the game in which headquarters decides on its optimal capital allocation in period 1. We begin by studying optimal capital allocation in the complete information case. Thereby, we refer to the situation in which managers' productivity is common knowledge. This characterization is then used to examine capital allocation in situations in which information on productivities is private to headquarters and managers are unable to distinguish headquarters'type.
The Benchmark Case: Complete Information
Since periods are additively separable we can derive the optimal capital allocation 1 under complete information simply from maximizing 1 ( 1 ) + 2 ( 2 ) with respect to 1 . Analogously to (6), 1 depends on marginal returns in divisions A and B. The di¤er-ence is that returns are exogenously given and hence independent from other decisions. 
Consequently, when productivities of divisions are common knowledge among headquarters and managers, our model implies: If divisions di¤er in their investment opportunities (type H), headquarters uses its allocative authority and consistently steers all funds to its strongest division A. Managers foresee headquarters' optimal strategy correctly anticipating that e¤ort has no impact on ex ante predetermined capital allocation. Hence there is no incentive for either manager to be productive. In contrast, if investment opportunities of divisions are similar (type L), headquarters'right to allocate funds to its most productive use creates the incentive for managers to work hard. In both periods headquarters allocates capital evenly. 1. For each type , headquarters' strategy is optimal given managers' strategies and managers'posterior beliefs.
2. Both managers share a common posterior belief which is derived from the prior belief p(L) = and headquarters'allocation 1 ; following Bayes'rule where applicable.
3. For each choice of 1 , managers' e¤ort levels following 1 constitute a Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game in which the probability that managers face a type L headquarters is given by their posterior belief ( 1 ).
Condition (2) implies that when 1 is not part of headquarters' optimal strategy for some type, any belief ( 1 ) is admissible since in equilibrium observing 1 is a zero probability event and beliefs cannot be derived following Bayes' rule. Thus, any e¤ort pair (e 1 ; e 2 ) may be played as long as it is a best response for some beliefs. In our model beliefs are common knowledge between all players. In addition, managers' beliefs are identical after any message, not just an equilibrium allocation. Condition (3) says, that given headquarters'allocation 1 and given their updated posterior beliefs ( 1 ) about , managers react optimally to headquarters'allocation 1 .
We determine the set of separating and pooling equilibria in pure strategies. In a separating equilibrium, both types of headquarters choose di¤erent allocations and managers can learn headquarters'type. In contrast, in a pooling equilibrium, both types of headquarters set the same allocation and managers can infer nothing from the allocation. As usual a multiplicity of equilibria arises since PBE does not impose any restrictions on managers' beliefs following out-of-equilibrium allocations. To provide sharp predictions on likely equilibrium outcomes, we restrict the set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs applying two well-known re…nements: the notions of Undefeated Equilibrium introduced by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) and D1 as introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987) . 7 In our model Undefeated Equilibrium intuitively applies as follows: Consider a proposed PBE 8 , some out-of-equilibrium allocation not chosen in this equilibrium as well as an alternative PBE in which some set of headquarters'type T plays in equilibrium. If each member of T strictly prefers the alternative equilibrium to the proposed one, the latter is said to be defeated.
9
D1, which is based on the idea of Divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987) , is implied by Strategic Stability introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens (1987) and tests if an out-of-equilibrium deviation is more likely to come from some headquarters'type i than from type j and if so, managers should not put any probability on j, hence p(jj ) = 0. Applying D1, an out-of-equilibrium deviation is said to be more likely to occur from type i if the set of managers'best responses which motivate i to deviate is strictly larger than the one which motivate type j.
Re…nement D1 puts restrictions on out-of equilibrium beliefs focusing on one single equilibrium, while Undefeated Equilibrium compares among equilibrium outcomes and therefore requires the characterization of the full set of PBE (considering all degrees of freedom with respect to out-of-equilibrium beliefs). Consequently, we start with the analysis of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. 7 For the joint relevance of both re…nement concepts in an evolutionary model of job-market signaling see Nöldeke and Samuelson (1997). 8 In general, Undefeated Equilibrium is applied to the notion of Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) . In our game PBE and Sequential Equilibria coincide (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . 9 This de…nition of Undefeated Equilibrium is valid since our model allows us to avoid issues connected with payo¤ ties of headquarters' types. For a general de…nition, the reader is referred to the original work.
Pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
We begin with a characterization of the set of pooling equilibria. We resume the notation of the previous sections -it is helpful to recall that ;2 refers to type 's period 2 equilibrium pro…t under complete information. Let ;1 ( ) denote type 's period 1 pro…t when it allocates .
In a pooling equilibrium, both types of headquarters choose p and managers learn nothing from capital allocation. 10 Bayesian updating implies that managers'beliefs after observing p equal the prior belief, p(Lj p ) = . O¤-equilibrium beliefs p(Lj^ ) are arbitrary as long as beliefs and corresponding o¤-equilibrium allocations^ 6 = p deter both types from deviating from p . We assume that a-priori probabilities
such that managers'best response after observing p is to exert e¤ort e i = e. 11 We hence obtain type 's pooling pro…ts P :
The easiest way to support p as equilibrium allocation is to restrict o¤-equilibrium beliefs such that managers decide to do nothing unless they observe p . Then, o¤-equilibrium payo¤s are lowest and deviating is least bene…cial for any type of headquarters. We set p(Lj ) = ( ) = 0 for any 6 = p as this belief function supports the largest set of pooling equilibria; and, to determine the set of admissible p , we maximize over all potential o¤-equilibrium allocations to solve for the highest out-of-equilibrium allocation under these beliefs. Thus, for any pooling equilibrium choice p , the following conditions must apply: 12 We illustrate this formulation 10 We disregard index t since we made period 2 allocations implicit in managers'tournament for funds. 11 For completeness, we examine the case in which condition (10) is violated in section 5. 12 The proof is quite straightforward considering the strict convexity of the left-hand-side of inequalities (11) and (12) 
When (13) does not hold, type H has no incentive to imitate L's full information allocation 1 = 0:5 as the cost from moving away from its full information optimum, H;1 H;1 ( 1 = 0:5) outweighs the gain from imitating type L, eI 2 . In this case, both types of headquarters are better o¤ by following their full information strategy. If condition (13) is met, a pooling equilibrium always exists since eI 2 relative to headquarter's cost from ine¢ cient investment at the crossing point of both curves is su¢ ciently high and also implies that condition (12) is non-binding. 13 Hence, we obtain a continuum of pooling equilibrium
p ], where p < 0:5 and p = 1: Figure 5 : Interval of Pooling Allocations P Consequently, inequalities (11) and (12) completely characterize the set of pooling equilibrium allocations. The easiest way to support these equilibria is to make out-of equilibrium outcomes small by setting p(Lj ) = ( ) = 0, for any out-of-equilibrium allocations 6 = p . However, any other belief which does not motivate some type of headquarters to deviate from its equilibrium allocation is also admissible.
13 It is easily shown that H;1 H;1 ( 
Separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
So far we have considered equilibria in which managers remain uninformed after observing headquarters'period 1 choice. Let us now characterize the set of separating equilibria. L denotes a separating equilibrium allocation, if headquarters is type L, and H , if headquarters is type H. We show that in any separating equilibrium a type H headquarters chooses H = 1, i.e. distributes all funds to its most pro…table division A, while a type L headquarters selects an allocation L which belongs to an interval -depending on …rm's speci…c conditions and managers'belief function.
In a separating equilibrium, headquarters'private information is revealed by its period 1 allocation. Posterior beliefs yield ( L ) = 1 and ( H ) = 0 and managers react optimally as under complete information. For the equilibrium to be separating, we must guarantee that L 6 = H and assure that allocations are incentive compatible. This implies that a type H headquarters does not want to pick type L's allocation and vice versa. In addition, o¤-equilibrium allocations (i.e. allocations that di¤er from both equilibrium choices) and corresponding beliefs must deter both types from deviating from their equilibrium action.
In a separating equilibrium each type prefers its own allocation as long as the following incentive-compatibility constraints apply:
Under incomplete information a type H headquarters, for instance, could deploy type L's allocation L to induce e¤ort and thereby raise divisional payo¤ in period 2 by eI 2 . However, if (14) holds, H has no incentive to do so. Condition (15) follows similarly.
In any separating equilibrium type H selects its full information allocation H = 1 and distributes all funds to division A. The intuition is that any other putative equilibrium allocation H 6 = 1 would motivate type H to deviate from the equilibrium strategy and raise allocations to the more pro…table division A without having further negative e¤ects on managers'e¤ort levels. 14 Using this …nding, H's incentive compatibility constraint, condition (14), simpli…es to: 14 Any putative equilibrium allocation^ H 6 = 1 would yield a strictly smaller payo¤ than a putative out-of equilibrium strategy H = 1 considering even most "favorable" o¤-equilibrium beliefs to sustain an equilibrium, namely < 2 We now analyze type L's incentive-compatibility constraint. A type L headquarters would never want to imitate H since H = 1 makes managers believe that headquarters is type H inducing them to do nothing, which immediately lowers productivity in period 2 by eI 2 : At the same time, H clearly makes L's period 1 investment weakly less e¢ cient than any other allocation. Hence, (15) holds for any L 2 [0; 1]: Consequently, the sole rationale to move away from its full information optimum and to select separating allocation L is to prevent type H to deviate and make pooling su¢ ciently costly. 15 However, in order to credibly signal its type, type L generally cannot select arbitrary L 's satisfying (16) as for any out-of-equilibrium allocation, there must exist (at least) some belief that would impede type L to deviate from L . Hence, analogously to the previous analysis of pooling equilibria, to determine the maximum set of admissible L , we need to maximize over all o¤-equilibrium allocations to solve for the highest out-of-equilibrium allocation under beliefs that would not induce e¤ort and impose
This result has an interesting yet simple interpretation: For L to be an equilibrium candidate, L's cost from ine¢ cient investment in period 1 must be weakly smaller than the productivity gain from defending second period gain from managerial e¤ort. Also, if condition (17) is violated, the cost of ine¢ cient investment relative to eI 2 is "too high", such that type L may be better o¤ not to signal its type.
Using inequalities (16) and (17), we characterize the maximum set of separating equilibrium allocations. In any separating equilibrium, type H's optimal choice equals its choice under full information, i.e. H = 1: Type L, however, chooses an allocation L which belongs to the interval
, where L and L denote the lower bounds of the interval solving (16) and (17), respectively. For illustration, we resume the case of the previous section in which condition (13) 
Equilibrium Re…nement
In the previous sections we have shown that there are two kinds of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in pure strategies for the case in which condition (13) The intuition underlying our solution concept is straightforward. We require headquarters and managers to reason "forward"such that starting from a conjectured equilibrium any deviation would provoke managers to form beliefs according to some hierarchy. By applying Undefeated Equilibrium, we require that initially managers interpret an o¤-equilibrium allocation as an attempt by some type of headquarters to consciously shift to another, preferred equilibrium and as a consequence adjust o¤-equilibrium beliefs accordingly. If such interpretation is not possible, managers ask which of headquarters' type is more likely to gain from this deviation compared to the conjectured equilibrium, applying the notion of D1. Once all o¤-equilibrium beliefs have been restricted according to this hierarchy, a conjectured equilibrium is reasonable only if neither of informed headquarters' types has an incentive to deviate.
Applying the re…nement requires several steps. It is helpful to recall that both, pooling allocations p and type L's separating allocations L ; induce managerial e¤ort e. First, diminishing returns to scale and L's optimum at = 0:5 make any separating equilibrium allocation L < z strictly less pro…table from type L's perspective than the least-cost separating equilibrium in which L = z: Hence L has an incentive to shift to its least-cost separating equilibrium which therefore defeats any other separating equilibrium. Second, notice that if headquarters is of type L, marginal productivities of divisions A and B are equal which implies that any capital allocation = is payo¤-equivalent to an allocation = 1 ; 2 [0; 1]. Hence, pooling equilibria at p > 1 z are not reasonable -if headquarters turns out to be L; the separating equilibrium at L = z yields a strictly higher payo¤ to this type. Third, consider any conjectured pooling equilibrium in which p < 0:5 and a deviation to = 0:5: Managers infer that the pooling equilibrium at p = 0:5 is being played as both types' payo¤ function is strictly increasing on the interval [z; 0 :5] . Since pooling at p = 0:5 also makes either type strictly better o¤ than the least cost separating equilibrium, the latter is also defeated. Undefeated Equilibrium therefore leaves an interval of pooling equilibria
Let us now show that pooling equilibria at p 2 (0:5; 1 z] do not survive D1. Consider any conjectured Undefeated Equilibrium on this interval and also a deviation to = 0:5: Following D1, managers immediately eliminate H as the potential defector. By defecting, type H strictly loses regardless of managers'beliefs (and corresponding e¤ort levels) as cost of ine¢ cient investment increases while managerial e¤ort in equilibrium is already at maximum. In other words, the set of managers'best responses that make H deviate is empty. On the other hand, type L clearly deviates to = 0:5 (its full information optimum), if managers form a belief that causes managers to provide e¤ort. Therefore, D1 requires that managers'beliefs following such defection should put all the weight on type L, which in turn forces type L to deviate from the conjectured pooling equilibrium.
Finally, we show that there exists a unique Undefeated Equilibrium which satis…es D1 -the pooling equilibrium at p = 0:5. By following its equilibrium strategy, L is strictly better o¤ than with any other allocation regardless of managers'beliefs; whereas H may obtain a higher payo¤ by defecting to 2 (0:5; 1] if causes managerial e¤ort only. Consequently, since H has a greater incentive to allocate (whereas L has none), D1 requires that the posterior belief conditioned on should be concentrated on type H. This argument in fact restricts o¤-equilibrium beliefs but does not rule out the equilibrium. H prefers to stick to the equilibrium since any allocation induces managers to reduce e¤ort and condition (13) holds.
Equilibrium Implications and Results
The following proposition summarizes the results from the previous section. 
; (e; e); separating equilibrium outcome which is the complete information outcome as described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 establishes that the incentive of headquarters to not disclose information on divisional productivity via capital allocation can be important enough to dominate the equilibrium outcome. This incentive is su¢ ciently strong when heterogeneous productivity across divisions is not too likely ex ante. Then, uninformed managers expect their e¤ort to have an impact on second-period capital allocation and engage in valueenhancing activities regardless of their relative rank with respect to productivities. In addition, the bene…t of increased second-period capital productivity must be su¢ ciently large to a type H headquarters compared to …rst-period cost from ine¢ cient investment such that pooling is pro…table.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2a, headquarters with private information on relative pro…tability of their divisions allocate …rst-period funds I 1 evenly according to p = 0:5; whereas capital allocation under full information is characterized by Corollary 1 follows from Propositions 1 and 2 and implies socialism in internal capital markets. Our model predicts that if investment opportunities across divisions are diverse as headquarters is type H, the …rm takes capital away from its more pro…table division, hence allocating too little to its "higher q" division A and too much to its "lower q" division B. Our model predicts a pooling equilibrium when the bene…ts to pooling are large for headquarters. The following result describes how these bene…ts are related to the relative capital productivity of divisions A and B and the levels of investment in the two periods. Private information hence improves equilibrium outcome to headquarters. From the perspective of the two-period investment cycle, either type of headquarters is (weakly) better o¤ following a nondisclosure (via capital) policy, which implies that the pooling equilibrium outcome dominates the full information outcome for both homogeneous and heterogeneous relative productivities. Having the opportunity to withhold information about true relative capital productivities thus raises …rm value.
Corollary 3 Under the assumptions of Proposition 2a, ceteris paribus, an increase in I 2 and e and a decrease in I 1 and x expand the set of remaining parameter values that yield the pooling equilibrium outcome as described in Proposition 2a.
< 0 since x kI 1 and x; I 1 ; k > 0:
Corollary 2 implies that pooling occurs if I 1 compared to I 2 is low and x < x max ; where x max solves H;1 H;1 ( p = 0:5) = eI 2 .
Discussion of Results and Empirical Implications
In this section we discuss our model's results. Our theory of internal capital markets yields a number of empirical implications.
a) Socialism in Internal Capital Markets
Corollary 1 implies socialism in internal capital markets. Our model predicts that multibusiness …rms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. This distortion of capital allocations is documented in empirical studies by Scharfstein (1998), Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000). Compared to previous research, our model provides an alternative explanation for socialistic internal capital market allocations. Our key argument is that headquarters uses funds to control managerial expectations about prospective assets under control which a¤ects e¤ort levels and future capital productivities. To boost managerial e¤ort, headquarters distributes capital more evenly than it would, if information were distributed symmetrically.
b) Relatedness of Businesses and Information Sharing
In Corollary 2 we raise the point that equal capital allocation in equilibrium is noninformative about the relative performance of divisions and either type of headquarters is (weakly) better o¤ compared to full information. Consequently, our model also provides an argument for limiting access to information on other divisions'business opportunities and in this respect for strategic lack of transparency within multi-business …rms. It also may serve as a rationale for why …rms may oppose regulation that increases transparency about individual units such as detailed segment reporting.
This argument leads to the question under which circumstances it is more feasible to withhold information about relative performance from divisional managers. This opportunity may be more pronounced when multi-business …rms operate strictly unrelated businesses and managers do not operate in the same or similar industries assuming that managers report investment quality directly to headquarters. In this case, predictions on other division's investment opportunities and hence relative performance assessment may be more challenging to achieve as managers may count less on their own knowledge with respect to industry, technology, products and regulation derived from own operations. This implication is consistent with the empirical study by Khanna and Tice (2001) , whose …ndings suggest that …rms with operations in related industries do not appear to subsidize weaker divisions.
c) Levels of Investments
An immediate empirical implication emerges from Corollary 3. Pooling, hence evenly distributed capital investment, should be prevalent in periods in which available internal funds are scarce compared to future periods. Then, ine¢ cient investment is less significant compared to the gain from inducing e¤ort to be utilized in upcoming periods in which funds are less constrained, and sacri…cing short run pro…ts is less costly relative to long term pro…ts. The argument points in two directions. First, we may interpret socialistic investment behavior as one action to motivate search for new opportunities during periods when funds are temporarily constrained (I 1 ). Second, pooling may also enhance the incentives to strongly exploit growth opportunities and prepare for periods of large investments (I 2 ), for instance, prior to capacity expansions and market entry.
d) Industry Shocks and Diversity of Investment Opportunities
Corollary 3 also implies that a pooling equilibrium is less likely if x is especially large and divisions are strongly heterogenous with respect to pro…table investment opportunities. For instance, consider a type H multi-business …rm which allocates capital evenly. Suppose also that one division is a¤ected by an exogenous industry shock which alters relative investment prospects in favor of division A: Industry shocks may include innovations, deregulation, policy changes, or a signi…cant change in input cost. As a consequence, relative di¤erence in investment prospects x may increase such that H;1 H;1 ( p = 0:5) > eI 2 : Then, our model predicts that headquarters is expected to move to another equilibrium -the separating equilibrium with …rm investing as under full information. In fact, separation which is that all funds I 1 are used for investments in a …rm's strongest division (provided that divisions are heterogeneous) appears to be established when …rms reorganize their businesses in cash-generating/low growth and cash-consuming/high growth businesses. For instance, GE views their portfolio as two distinct groups: Cash Generators provide strong cash ‡ow to the Growth Engines, businesses with many pro…table investment opportunities and strong growth [see General Electric, Annual Report 2003].
Extension
So far, we have focused on the situation in which divisional managers exert e¤ort in case they do not learn anything from period-1 capital allocation (equation (10)); in other words, when their posterior belief regarding the probability of facing a type L headquarters equals their prior belief. In this section, we brie ‡y discuss the situation in which p(L) = < 2 < eI 2 holds, there does not exist a pooling equilibrium as pooling is not an attractive proposition for either type of headquarters. Also, the complete information outcome as characterized in Proposition 1 is not an equilibrium outcome as a type H headquarters has an incentive to mimic type L headquarters'complete information allocation of L = 0:5. We omit a detailed analysis here, but it can be shown that under some additional parametric restrictions there exists a unique separating equilibrium outcome in which L 2 (0; 0:5) and H = 1. Type L headquarters allocates more period-1 capital to division B than to division A despite equal capital productivities in order to render it too costly for type H headquarters to mimic its allocation.
This result implies that on average division B obtains a larger period-1 capital allocation than it would under complete information. Therefore, the internal capital market displays "socialistic" behavior also under circumstances in which pooling does not lead to e¤ort provision.
One di¤erence to the pooling equilibrium outcome characterized in Proposition 1 is that in the separating outcome described here ex ante expected pro…ts are lower than under complete information. This implies that ex ante headquarters has an incentive to commit to creating transparency about investment opportunities across divisions.
Conclusion
This paper provides a novel explanation for the socialistic allocation of resources in internal capital markets based on asymmetric information between headquarters and divisional managers about the relative levels of capital productivity across divisions. Headquarters may choose an even capital allocation initially in order to create competition for future funds which in turn improves future capital productivity.
